Special Interest Politics

List of Figures......Page 12
Preface......Page 14
1 Introduction......Page 18
1.1 SIG Activities and Tactics......Page 21
1.2.1 Methodology......Page 31
1.2.2 Organization and Content......Page 33
I Voting......Page 56
2 Voting and Elections......Page 58
2.1.1 The Median Voter and the Agenda Setter......Page 59
2.1.3 Direct Democracy without Agenda Setters......Page 62
2.1.4 Non-Single-Peaked Preferences......Page 65
2.1.5 Multiple Policy Issues......Page 67
2.1.6 Summary......Page 69
2.2 Representative Democracy......Page 70
2.2.1 The Downsian Model......Page 71
2.2.2 Candidates with Policy Preferences......Page 73
2.2.3 Endogenous Candidates......Page 76
2.3 Electing a Legislature......Page 81
2.3.1 Single-Member Districts......Page 82
2.3.2 Proportional Representation......Page 85
3 Groups as Voters......Page 92
3.1 Turnout......Page 93
3.2 Knowledge......Page 104
3.3 Partisanship......Page 112
II Information......Page 118
4 Lobbying......Page 120
4.1 One Lobby......Page 122
4.1.1 The Setting......Page 123
4.1.2 Two States of the World......Page 124
4.1.3 Three States of the World......Page 127
4.1.4 Continuous Information......Page 130
4.1.5 Ex Ante Welfare......Page 135
4.2 Two Lobbies......Page 137
4.2.1 Like Bias......Page 138
4.2.2 Opposite Bias......Page 147
4.2.3 Multidimensional Information......Page 150
4.3 Appendix: A More General Lobbying Game......Page 155
4.3.1 The General Setting......Page 156
4.3.2 Properties of an Equilibrium......Page 157
5 Costly Lobbying......Page 160
5.1.1 Single Lobby, Dichotomous Information......Page 162
5.1.2 Single Lobby, Continuous Information......Page 167
5.1.3 Two Lobbies......Page 169
5.2.1 Dichotomous Information......Page 178
5.2.2 Many States of Nature......Page 181
5.2.3 Multiple Interest Groups......Page 185
5.3 Access Costs......Page 188
5.3.1 Group with a Known Bias......Page 189
5.3.2 Group with an Unknown Bias......Page 193
5.3.3 Access Fees as Signals of SIG Preferences......Page 197
6 Educating Voters......Page 202
6.1.1 The Voters......Page 205
6.1.2 The Parties......Page 208
6.1.3 The Interest Group......Page 209
6.2 Early Communication......Page 211
6.2.2 Credible Messages......Page 212
6.2.3 Who Gains and Who Loses?......Page 216
6.3 Late Communication......Page 218
6.3.1 Reports and Voting......Page 219
6.3.2 Political Competition......Page 221
6.3.3 Early and Late Communication......Page 226
6.4 Endorsements......Page 227
6.5 Educating Members......Page 229
6.6 Appendix: SIG Leaders with a Broad Mandate......Page 233
6.6.1 Communication Game When SIG Leaders Have a Broad Mandate......Page 234
6.6.2 Political Competition When SIG Leaders Have a Broad Mandate......Page 237
6.6.3 A Comparison of Two Mandates......Page 238
III Campaign Contributions......Page 240
7 Buying Influence......Page 242
7.1 One-Dimensional Policy Choice......Page 243
7.2 The Allocation of Public Spending......Page 250
7.3 Multiple Policy Instruments......Page 252
7.4 Regulation and Protection......Page 255
7.5 Bargaining......Page 260
8 Competing for Influence......Page 264
8.1 The Politician as Common Agent......Page 266
8.2 The Minimum Wage......Page 273
8.3 Compensating Equilibria......Page 282
8.4 Trade Policy......Page 287
8.5 Redistributive Taxation......Page 292
8.6 Competition for Influence: Good Thing or Bad Thing?......Page 296
9 Influencing a Legislature......Page 300
9.1 Buying Votes......Page 301
9.2 A Legislature with an Agenda Setter......Page 308
9.3 Multiple Interest Groups......Page 316
9.3.1 Randomized Offers......Page 319
9.3.2 Competing for Influence at the Proposal Stage......Page 326
9.3.3 The Scale of a Public Project......Page 331
10 Contributions and Elections......Page 336
10.1.1 The Voters......Page 338
10.1.2 The Parties......Page 341
10.1.3 The Interest Groups......Page 343
10.2.1 The Influence Motive......Page 345
10.2.2 A Pure Electoral Motive......Page 348
10.2.3 A Choice of Motives......Page 351
10.3 Multiple Interest Groups......Page 356
References......Page 364
Index......Page 374